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I show that exporter market power reduces the benefits of international trade for farmers.
Using microdata from Ecuador, I link exporters to the farmers who supply them across the
universe of cash crops. I document that farmers earn significantly less when they sell crops
in export markets that are highly concentrated. I propose a model in which farmers choose
a crop to produce and an exporter to supply. Exporter market power is driven by two
key elasticities, which govern heterogeneity in farmer costs of switching crops and switching
exporters. I develop a method to estimate them using exporter responses to international
price shocks. The estimates imply that farmers earn only half of their marginal revenue
product as a result of market power. I evaluate the effectiveness of agricultural support
policies in this setting. Fair Trade emerges as a practical tool for fighting market power and
helping farmers share in the gains from globalization.
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1 Introduction
Two thirds of the world’s poor work in agriculture. Many of them live in developing countries,
where agriculture also accounts for a large share of export revenue. The division of surplus
in agricultural value chains therefore has important distributional implications for farmer
well-being. Many small farmers sell crops to a few large exporters, who control access to
more lucrative international markets. This concentration creates the potential for both
inefficiency and inequality, with adverse consequences falling on farmers. Exporters can
use their bargaining power to depress crop prices and quantities, preventing farmers from
receiving the benefits of globalization.
This paper quantifies the effect of exporter market power on farmer income in a developing
country. Measuring market power in this setting is challenging, as it requires knowledge of
farmer-exporter relationships at a micro level. Using confidential tax records from Ecuador,
I assemble a rich new dataset which maps the value chain for over 100 exported agricultural
products. I link Customs data, which measures the revenue of exporters, with Value Added
Tax (VAT) data, which measures their payments to suppliers, and firm registry data, which
allows me to identify which suppliers are farmers. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
first paper to bring such data to bear on the question of buyer power.
I document three new facts about agricultural value chains using this dataset. First,
agricultural markets in Ecuador are highly concentrated, with just a few exporters in each
crop purchasing the entire value produced by farmers. Second, the income earned by farmers
of a given crop is low relative to exporter sales of the same crop. Either exporters add a lot
of value to crops, or they exert a lot of market power over farmers. Third, I show that farmer
income as a share of exporter sales – the farmer share – is lower when the exporter controls
more of the crop market, even after controlling for measures of exporter value added. This
last fact exploits the unique microstructure of the data in order to link the first two facts
and suggest market power among exporters as a potential explanation.
To quantify the importance of market power, I extend a frontier model of oligopsony in
1
labor markets (Berger, Herkenhoff, and Mongey 2019; Atkeson and Burstein 2008) to the
context of crop markets. Farmers choose which crop to produce and which exporter to supply.
They trade off the price offered by each exporter with their idiosyncratic shocks for produc-
ing that crop and reaching that exporter. Through these shocks, the model stochastically
captures the land’s suitability for different crops and the farmer’s proximity to different
exporters, two key dimensions of heterogeneity in models of agricultural trade (Costinot,
Donaldson, and Smith 2016; Sotelo 2020). The more costly it is for farmers to switch from
coffee to cocoa, or to switch from one coffee exporter to another, the greater the scope for
market power.
Exporters act strategically when purchasing crops, internalizing their influence over
prices. The optimal price they pay to farmers is marked down from the price they re-
ceive on international markets, where they do not act strategically. The price is lower when
the exporter controls more of the crop market – precisely the relationship I find in the data.
In the model, the strength of the relationship is determined by the elasticities of substitution
across crops and across exporters within a crop. The lower they are, the greater the market
power of large exporters, and the faster that prices fall with exporter size.
The elasticities are therefore crucial to measuring market power. To estimate them,
I exploit the fact that Ecuador is a small open economy and use variation in how small
and large exporters respond to changes in international prices. Intuitively, the sensitivity
of large exporters to demand shocks is driven by how easily farmers can substitute across
crops, while the sensitivity of small exporters is driven by how easily farmers can substitute
across intermediaries within a crop. Formally, the average pass-through of demand shocks to
producer prices is low when the elasticity of substitution across exporters is low, and declines
a lot with exporter size when the elasticity of substitution across crops is low. I find that
both elasticities are small, indicating that crop supply is relatively inelastic and exporters
have substantial market power.
The model allows me to measure market power in several ways. I show that farmer
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prices are marked down to 49% of their marginal revenue products, implying large gains
simply from eliminating markdowns and redistributing exporter profits to farmers. Indeed,
a counterfactual economy with perfectly competitive exporters would see a 77% increase in
farmer income, two thirds of which is explained by redistribution. The remaining third are
efficiency gains from farmers reallocating across crops and across exporters within crops.
The largest gains are in the most concentrated crops, such as coffee.
In the final part of the paper, I use the estimated model to study the impact of two
popular agricultural support policies: Fair Trade and price floors. Fair Trade is the fastest-
growing certification program for sustainable farming. Buyers pay higher prices to promote
the economic well-being of certified farmers, which they recover by selling a differentiated
Fair Trade product to consumers who care about farmer well-being. I model Fair Trade by
introducing an exporter who behaves competitively and therefore pays a premium relative to
other exporters. This has a positive direct effect on the farmers who supply the Fair Trade
exporter. It also has a positive indirect effect, since the Fair Trade exporter reduces the
market power of other exporters, forcing them to raise prices. Together, these effects can
raise farmer income up to 25%.
To highlight the effectiveness of Fair Trade, I consider a second policy in which the
government sets a price floor in each crop. This also has a positive direct effect on prices,
since exporters can no longer offer prices below the floor. Unlike Fair Trade, however, it
has a negative indirect effect. The smallest exporters contract, increasing the market power
of larger exporters who can afford to pay the minimum price. Because of these offsetting
effects, high price floors are required to realize the income gains from Fair Trade. Fair




Downstream buyers such as traders and processing firms are important links in agricultural
supply chains, and a growing literature examines how they influence farmer welfare in devel-
oping countries. One way that buyers influence farmer income is by using their bargaining
power to depress farmgate prices.1 Studies of buyer power often focus on a single commodity
in a single country.2 While we know that buyer power adversely affects farmers in many of
these markets, we know little about its prevalence and potential consequences across the
entire economy. Chatterjee (2019) sheds light on both a specific mechanism through which
intermediaries exert market power – spatial variation in bargaining power of farmers – and
quantifies its impact across several crops in India. Dhingra and Tenreyro (2020) show that
farmer income in Kenya is higher on average when they sell to large intermediaries, but
less responsive to changes in international prices. Relative to these contributions, I lever-
age microdata on both farmers and buyers to measure market power across the universe of
exported agricultural products in Ecuador.
A broader body of literature seeks to understand the distribution of surplus between buy-
ers and sellers in value chains. In general, studies have focused on the manufacturing sector,
and to the extent that they have considered the market power of firms, they have focused on
adverse consequences for consumers. The typical approach involves first estimating a firm’s
production function and then using the estimates to purge reported profits of unobserved
value added. The residual measures market power (De Loecker and Warzynski 2012). This
approach mirrors the dominant industrial organization paradigm, which infers value added
from the firm’s demand function and has a rich history dating back to Bresnahan (1989).
Researchers have employed this approach to document substantial output market power
1Another way is through relationships. In Costa Rica, long-term relationships between coffee farmers and
buyers restrict trade relative to vertical integration (Macchiavello and Miquel-Florensa 2017). In Rwanda,
long-term relationships raise farmer income (Macchiavello and Morjaria 2020).
2For example, cocoa in Sierra Leone (Casaburi, Reed, Casaburi, and Reed 2019), bananas in Costa Rica
(Van Patten and Mendez-Chacon 2020), potatoes in India (Mitra, Mookherjee, Torero, and Visaria 2018),
and maize in Kenya (Bergquist and Dinerstein 2020).
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and corresponding losses for consumers in various contexts (De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger
2020; De Loecker and Warzynski 2012; De Loecker and Goldberg 2014; De Loecker, Goldberg,
Khandelwal, and Pavcnik 2016). Morlacco (2019) adapts the approach to a context where
buyers have monopsony power over their suppliers. She shows that suppliers receive prices
below their marginal revenue products, and consumers suffer losses from inefficiently low
output.
I take a more direct approach, following the literature on buyer power in the labor
market and its effects on workers. Several studies demonstrate that workers’ wages in the
United States are marked down from their marginal products, with large consequences for
consumer welfare (Berger et al. 2019; Azar, Berry, and Marinescu 2019; Azkarate-Askasua
and Zerecero 2020; Lamadon, Mogstad, and Setzler 2019). Of these, my approach most
closely resembles that of Berger et al. (2019), who extend the framework of Atkeson and
Burstein (2008) to the context of buyer market power. Their framework features Cournot
competition among manufacturing firms and a nested CES supply curve for labor derived
from worker substitution across and within labor markets.
I focus on buyer market power of exporters in the agricultural sector, which is largely
absent from this literature because of its focus on developed countries. My model also
features Cournot competition among exporters and a nested CES supply curve for crops. I
microfound the supply curve with a discrete choice model of farmer production decisions. In
this way, I forge a connection with a body of literature that estimates farmer substitution
across and within crops using agricultural production data (Costinot et al. 2016; Sotelo 2020;
Farrokhi and Pellegrina 2020; Bergquist, Faber, Fally, Hoelzlein, Miguel, and Rodriguez-
Clare 2019).
I estimate buyer power based on how farmer income responds to changes in international
prices and how this response varies with the size of the exporter. This approach resembles
that of Atkin and Donaldson (2015) and Bergquist and Dinerstein (2020), who use variation
in pass-through across firms and locations to measure seller market power. Rubens (2020)
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combines pass-through and production function techniques to measure the buyer market
power faced by farmers in rural China, but focuses on a single product: tobacco. In contrast,
I estimate market power in products as diverse as fruit and fish, and use the estimated model
to evaluate policies designed to fight market power, such as Fair Trade.
Several studies evaluate the effectiveness of Fair Trade and related certification programs.3
The key feature of these programs is that certified exporters pay certified farmers a premium
for sustainably produced crops. Podhorsky (2015) argues that Fair Trade has both a direct
effect on the farmers that participate in the program and a spillover effect on other farmers
by reducing the market power of non-participating exporters. The majority of evidence on
Fair Trade concerns a single product: coffee. Dragusanu and Nunn (2018) provide empiri-
cal evidence of both channels in the Costa Rican coffee sector. De Janvry, McIntosh, and
Sadoulet (2015) document the adverse consequences of excess entry into Fair Trade certi-
fication by coffee farmers throughout Central America. Macchiavello and Miquel-Florensa
(2019) examine the effects of more complex certifications involving international coffee buy-
ers in addition to farmers and exporters. Relative to this literature, I incorporate Fair Trade
into a general equilibrium structural model, which allows me to estimate its impact across
many different products and compare it to alternative agricultural support policies, such as
minimum producer prices.
To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to measure buyer power and estimate the
impact of pro-farmer policies across such a broad range of crops. To do so, I combine
firm-level data on agricultural exports from Ecuador with data on domestic buyer-supplier
relationships. Other studies have employed similar datasets to examine how domestic net-
works shape the effects of globalization in various contexts (Kikkawa, Magerman, and Dhyne
2019; Huneeus 2018; Adao, Carrillo, Costinot, Donaldson, and Pomeranz 2019; Alfaro-Ureña,
Manelici, and Carvajal 2019). Given the growing availability of network data through col-
laborations with government statistical agencies worldwide, bringing such data to bear on
3See Dragusanu, Giovannucci, and Nunn (2014) for a comprehensive review.
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the question of buyer market power paves a path for future research.4
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide an overview of agriculture
exports in Ecuador, discuss the construction of my value chain dataset, and present key
facts. In Section 3, I develop a model of farmer crop choice and exporter strategic pricing
to quantify market power. In Section 4, I estimate the model and validate it. In Section
5, I use the estimated model to measure the market power faced by farmers. In Section 6,
I conduct counterfactual analyses of Fair Trade and other agricultural support policies. I
conclude in Section 7 by discussing the limitations of the current study and the directions
for future research.
2 Data
In this section, I map the entire value chain across the universe of exported crops in Ecuador.
To do so, I combine administrative microdata on firm-product exports from Customs dec-
larations, firm-to-firm transactions from VAT declarations, and firm characteristics from a
national registry. I document three new facts about value chains using this dataset, which
together point to the importance of exporter market power.
2.1 Ecuador: an ideal setting
Ecuador is a microcosm of the issues surrounding agricultural trade in emerging economies.
GDP per capita in Ecuador is a little over $6,000, close to the global median. Agriculture
employs almost 30% of the workforce and accounts for over half of export revenues. Across
all developing countries, agriculture employs 40% of the workforce and generates a third of
export revenues (Cheong, Jansen, and Peters 2013).
Despite its small size, Ecuador is an important producer of cash crops such as cocoa,
4Kikkawa et al. (2019) consider seller market power. Other papers assume perfect competition.
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coffee, bananas, palm, shrimp, tuna, and cut flowers. More generally, developing countries
account for more than a third of agricultural trade, and more than half of seafood trade
(Aksoy and Beghin 2004). Cash crops are typically produced by many small farms, and
exported by only a handful of large firms. Domestic consumption of cash crops is low,
as they command much higher prices in international markets. Across South America, the
largest 5% of exporting firms receive 80% of export revenue (Cunha, Reyes, and Pienknagura
2019). In contrast, most crops are produced on small farms, and average farm size has been
decreasing over time (Lowder, Skoet, and Raney 2016). Even in the banana sector, which
has historically been dominated by vertically-integrated, multinational giants like Chiquita
and Dole, there has been a trend toward divestment from plantations (FAO 2014). In
Ecuador, these multinationals control less than 20% of the export market, and most of the
remaining exporters do not produce bananas themselves, but instead source from thousands
of producers (Wong 2008).
A disproportionate share of the poor work in agriculture, both in Ecuador and across
developing countries (Townsend 2015). Income gains in the agricultural sector are therefore
crucial for reducing poverty. Ecuador offers an ideal setting for studying an important barrier
to such gains: the lack of competition among exporters.5 To examine this barrier on a large
scale, I partner with the Tax Authority of Ecuador (Servicio de Rentas Internas, henceforth
SRI) to access several administrative databases, which together allow me to trace the value
of crops all the way from farm to port.
2.2 Mapping agricultural value chains
A key challenge to tracing the value of crops from farm to port is that farmers typically do
not export directly. To overcome this challenge, I proceed in several steps: (1) calculate the
value received by exporters, (2) match exporters to their suppliers, (3) calculate the value
received by each supplier, and (4) identify which suppliers are farmers. I combine several
5In informational interviews I conducted in Ecuador, producers frequently cited low bargaining power as
a barrier to receiving higher prices.
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administrative datasets obtained in collaboration with the SRI.
The first dataset covers the universe of export transactions from 2008-2011. The data
are compiled from Customs declarations and contain the value and quantity traded inter-
nationally for each firm, product, and year.6 For step (1), I use the data to calculate the
value received by exporters. I restrict my attention to animal products, vegetable products,
and foodstuffs (HS 2-digit codes 01-24), which represent roughly half of all exports from
Ecuador.
The second dataset captures the universe of domestic firm-to-firm transactions from
2008-2011. The data are derived from Value Added Tax declarations and measure the value
transacted for each buyer-seller pair and year. Using these data, for step (2) I construct the
network of suppliers for each exporter. For step (3) I can then calculate the value paid by
each exporter to each of his suppliers.
The third dataset contains basic characteristics for all firms active in 2011. The data
are pulled from a national register and include the industry and location of each firm.7 In
step (4), I use the data to identify which suppliers are farmers. Taxpayers in the agriculture,
forestry, and fishing industries (ISIC 2-digit codes 01-03) are classified as farmers.8
My novel agricultural value chain dataset comprises almost 1,000 exporters selling 100
agricultural products sourced from 50,000 farmers. Table 1 summarizes the farmers and
exporters in my dataset. The median exporter is large, earning over $1 million and employing
more than 20 people. In contrast, the median farm is tiny, earning less than $9,000 annually.
Furthermore, 94% of farmers are self-employed. Almost three quarters of exporters are in
the wholesale sector, implying that few farmers export directly.9 However, 75% of farmer
sales are indirectly exported, indicating the importance of mapping the value chain.
6Products are classified at the HS 6-digit level.
7Industries are classified up to the ISIC 5-digit level.
8A fourth dataset includes matched employee-employer information from 2008-2011. The data are derived
from Social Security Tax declarations and record the earnings and employers for each worker and year. Using
these data, I can calculate the employment and wage bill for each exporter.
9An exception is the cut flower industry, where many small farms export directly. I exclude these from
the analysis.
9
A few important concerns arise when using tax information to study agricultural value
chains. First, information may be missing due to informal labor in the agricultural sector.
Several factors mitigate this concern. The VAT records underlying my dataset are filed by
the purchasing firm, in this case a large exporter. If anything, large firms have an incentive
to over-report the value they pay to farmers, as their tax liability is assessed on the difference
between sales and purchases.10 To the extent that they still under-report crop purchases,
my estimates of the farmer income would be biased downward, and a measure of market
power derived solely from farmer income would be biased upward. Instead, I infer market
power from how farmer income responds to demand shocks, further mitigating the concern.
I discuss this point in detail in Section 4.












$ Wage Bill 0
# Employees 0
% Self-employed 94
% Export Intensity 75
Observations 49,475
Notes: Panel A shows summary statistics across exporters. Panel B shows summary statistics across farmers.
Rows 1-4 show medians. Rows 5-6 show means.
A second concern is that the data may not be capturing small family farms, but rather
large factory farms. The median farm does not report any employees or wages, consistent
with the high rate of self-employment. In principle, I could calculate farmer income as
the sum of (a) sales of self-employed farmers and (b) wages paid by larger farms to their
employees.11 However, not all farm employees are farmers, and farm owners may be farmers
10Pomeranz (2015) shows that the VAT is an effective deterrent to tax evasion. Carrillo, Pomeranz, and
Singhal (2017) show that to the extent that firms still cheat, they tend to over-report costs.
11Adao et al. (2019) follow this approach for manufacturing industries in Ecuador.
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themselves. To avoid distributing farm sales among employees and owners and arbitrarily
deciding who is a farmer, I measure farmer income as sales and make no distinction between
farms and farmers. This is equivalent to assuming that all farm sales are paid to farmers,
which will overestimate farmer income (since not all workers and owners are farmers). At
the same time, this underestimates the number of farmers (since even small family farms
contain multiple farmers). Importantly, I infer market power without using any information
on farm size. To the extent that small farms face more market power than large farms, I
will underestimate it.
A final limitation is that VAT records measure trade between firms in general rather than
trade of a particular product between firms. A few features of agricultural value chains in
Ecuador allow me to overcome this limitation. First, unlike in more complex value chains,
where firms in different industries produce important components of the final product, the
key producers in agricultural value chains are farmers and fishers. They are the ones who
harvest fruits from plants and fish from water, and since I observe them in my dataset, I can
pin down both ends of the value chain. If the exporter at one end only exports coffee and
has few domestic sales, I can be confident that the product he purchases from the farmer
at the other end is coffee. This is a reasonable approximation for Ecuador, where (a) the
majority of exported crops are produced exclusively for the international market and (b) the
majority of exporters export a single crop. Table 1 shows that 76% of exporters fall into this
category.12 Finally, farmers typically sell to a single exporter, so it is unlikely that farmers
produce multiple different crops for export. Together, these facts imply that I can infer the
product being traded between farmers and exporters in my dataset.
Table 2 summarizes the funnel-like structure of agricultural value chains.13 The median
exporter buys from 24 farmers, but the median farmer only sells to a single exporter. This
is true both in the aggregate and within many of the top exported products. For example,
12I assign multi-product exporters to their top product, which accounts for over 90% of exports for these
firms.
13See the appendix for additional network statistics.
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shrimp is the second most important product, with over 2 billion dollars in export sales.
There are almost 6,000 shrimp farmers along the coast, but only 50 shrimp exporters. This
creates the potential for unequal sharing of the gains from globalization. Next, I leverage
the micro-structure of my dataset to document this inequality in great detail.
Table 2: Exporter-farmer networks
$ Exports # Exporters # Farmers Exporter Farmer
(Millions) Indegree Outdegree
All Crops 16,954 804 49,745 24 1
Bananas 6,038 188 9,685 81 3
Shrimp 2,208 50 5,729 77 1
Tuna 2,043 22 1,825 54 1
Cocoa 1,314 56 17,686 363 2
Palm oil 616 13 7,821 1,640 2
Coffee 110 17 1,611 28 1
Notes: Table summarizes exporter-farmer networks across 157 crops defined at HS 6-digit level. Row 2 shows
all crops. Rows 3-8 show a selection of the top crops. Columns 2-4 show totals. Column 5 shows the median
number of farmers supplying each exporter (indegree). Column 6 shows the median number of exporters
supplied by each farmer (outdegree).
2.3 Exporter concentration and the farmer share
I document three new facts about supply chains of agricultural exports from Ecuador. To-
gether, they suggest that exporters exercise market power in crop markets. They motivate
the development of a model to explore the consequences for small farmers.
2.3.1 Crop markets are highly concentrated
To examine the potential for market power across a broad range of crops, I divide crops into
six bins based on the number of exporters present: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5-9, 10+. Figure 1 plots the
distribution across these bins for more than 100 crops. Panel A indicates that the majority
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of crop markets are highly concentrated: the median crop is dominated by a single firm, and
almost all crops have fewer than 10 exporters.
On the one hand, Panel A may understate the degree of concentration in crop markets. As
an example, consider the market for cocoa, which has 56 exporters in Table 2 and is therefore
in the “10+” bin. However, the top 4 cocoa exporters control almost the entire export
market, such that cocoa effectively belongs in the “4” bin. To capture this phenomenon
more generally, I take advantage of the micro-structure of my dataset and define the effective
number of exporters as the number of exporters required to control 90% of the market for a
given crop. Then, the effective number of exporters for cocoa is 4. On the other hand, Panel
A may overstate the importance of concentration in crop markets. For instance, the banana,
Ecuador’s largest exported crop by value, remains in the “10+” bin even after adjusting for
the effective number of exporters.
Panel B of Figure 1 addresses both of these concerns: it plots the distribution of the
effective number of exporters across crops, weighted by the share of total exports in each
bin. Although concentration appears less stark than in Panel A, about 40% of crop value is
still sold in markets with fewer than 10 exporters. Concentration on its own does not imply
market power. To establish some evidence of market power, I take advantage of the matched
nature of my dataset in the next fact.
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Figure 1: Crop market concentration
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Notes: Panel A plots the distribution of the number of exporters by crop across 157 exported crops. Panel
B plots the effective number of exporters, defined as the minimum number required to control 90% of the
market, and weighted by the share of export value in each bin.
2.3.2 Farmers receive a small share of the export value of their crops
Exporters exercise market power over farmers by forcing them to accept lower prices. To
investigate this, I compute the value that each exporter pays to farmers as a share of the
value he earns from selling their crops on the international market. I refer to this as the
farmer share for exporter i of crop j:
farmer shareij ≡ exporter i’s purchases of crop jexporter i’s sales of crop j
Panel A of Figure 2 shows the distribution of the farmer share across all exporters. The
blue line indicates an average farmer share of around 0.25, meaning that for every dollar of
agricultural products exported from Ecuador, farmers earn 25 cents. Many exporters have
farmer shares lower than 10%, while very few have shares above 50%. As above, Panel A
may not accurately reflect the distribution of farmer shares, since large exporters receive the
same weight as small exporters.
To address this concern, Panel B shows the distribution weighted by the share of total
exports. The distribution shifts to the right, indicating that exporters paying a larger share
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of export sales to farmers are generally larger exporters. Still, the weighted average farmer
share is less than one third.
An alternative explanation for the low farmer shares depicted in Figure 2 is that exporters
add value to crops by transforming or transporting them. For example, a cocoa exporter
may re-package the beans he purchases from farmers before selling them internationally, or
ship them from the eastern Amazon provinces where a substantial share of cocoa is grown
to the coastal port of Guayaquil. In my dataset, this could appear as wages or payments to
suppliers who are not classified as farmers. I exploit this dimension of the data to establish
the next fact, and use the model to definitively distinguish between value added and market
power.
Figure 2: Farmer share of export value
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Notes: Panel A plots the distribution of the farmer share across exporters. Panel B plots the same distribution
weighted by each exporter’s share of total sales. The dashed blue lines depict the simple average and weighted
average across exporters, respectively.
2.3.3 The farmer share is lower when exporters are more concentrated
Neither the high exporter concentration in fact 1 nor the low farmer shares in fact 2 alone
are sufficient evidence of market power. To establish a connection between them, I define
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the relative size of exporter i in crop j as the value purchased by exporter i as a share of
the total market for crop j.
exporter sizeij ≡ exporter i’s purchases of crop jtotal purchases of crop j
An exporter with relative size near 1 controls the entire market for a crop and is therefore
a monopsonist, while an exporter with relative size near 0 exerts little control. If the relative
size of an exporter measures his potential for market power, and he realizes this potential by
forcing farmers to accept lower prices, then we should see a negative relationship between
farmer shares and relative exporter size. Figure 3 confirms this: on average, an exporter
who controls all of the market pays 20 percentage points less to farmers than an exporter
who controls none of it. At the mean farmer share of 0.25 in Figure 2, this represents an
80% decrease.



















Notes: Figure plots relative exporter size on the x-axis and farmer shares of export value on the y-axis. Dots
indicate the average farmer share within bins. Solid blue line indicates predictions from a linear regression
on full (unbinned) sample. Grey area indicates a 95% confidence interval.
Figure 3 pools exporters across all crops. However, farmer shares should be lower in crops
that require extensive transformation or transportation. If this in turn requires large fixed
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investments in machines or vehicles, such crops may have fewer exporters in equilibrium.
For example, the shrimp market may have more exporters and larger farmer shares than the
cocoa market simply because shrimp is sourced along the coast, whereas cocoa is sourced
as far as the Amazon, removed from major ports. In this case, farmer shares and relative
exporter size would be negatively correlated, even if exporters did not exercise market power.
A similar phenomenon may play out within crops. For example, 80% of cocoa is grown in
coastal provinces. If sourcing the remaining 20% from inland provinces requires large fixed
investments that only large exporters can afford, the same spurious correlation would arise.
To show that the negative relationship between farmer shares and relative exporter size
is unlikely to be driven by systematic differences in technologies across crops and exporters,
I estimate a series of regressions:14
log(farmer shareijt) = βexporter sizeijt + X′ijtΓ + δjt + εijt
where X is a vector of controls, δ is a crop-year fixed effect, ε is an error term, and t indexes
the year. The coefficient of interest, β, measures the relationship between exporter size and
farmer shares. Table 3 displays the results. Column 1 shows the baseline specification with
no controls or fixed effects, consistent with Figure 3. Column 2 includes product-year fixed
effects to control for systematic differences across crops.15 Because some 6-digit products
(crops) are controlled by a single exporter, fixed effects are at the 2-digit product level.
Column 3 controls for systematic differences across exporters by adding wages, payments to
non-farm suppliers, log export prices, and an indicator for exporters with relative size less
than 1%. In Column 4, exporters are weighted by their share of total exports to ensure that
the relationship is not driven by variation within small crops.
14Alternative specifications are shown in the appendix.
15Relative exporter size is highly correlated over time, which precludes the use of the exporter fixed effects.
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Table 3: Farmer shares and exporter concentration
Log Farm Share Log Farm Share Log Farm Share Log Farm Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exporter Size -0.823 -0.681 -0.530 -0.542
(0.158) (0.185) (0.180) (0.066)
FE No Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes
Weights No No No Yes
Observations 1,923 1,923 1,923 1,923
R2 0.014 0.355 0.397 0.574
Notes: Column 1 shows regression of log farmer shares on relative exporter size. Column 2 adds product-year
fixed effects. Column 3 adds time-varying controls described in text. Column 4 weights each observation by
the share of total exports. Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses.
My preferred specification in Column 3 indicates that farmers earn 50% less from the
largest exporters, controlling for systematic differences across crops and exporters. This fact
connects the first two and suggests market power among exporters as a potential explanation.
To quantify the importance of market power, I develop a model in the next section. Later, I
use all three facts to estimate and validate the model. Variation in exporter size conditional
on fixed effects and controls comes from unobserved differences in exporter productivity,
one of the primitives of the model. This variation explains farmer shares via substitution
patterns across crops and across exporters within a crop, the other primitives of the model.
3 Theory
In this section, I develop a model of imperfect competition among exporters in the market
for crops. Farmers choose a crop to produce and sell to exporters, who have market power.
The concentration of exporters, and hence their market power, differs across and within
crops and impacts farmer well-being. The formulation of the model builds on the work
of Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Berger et al. (2019). I model the farmer’s choice of
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crop and exporter as a discrete choice problem, which yields a nested CES supply curve for
crops. Given this supply curve and Cournot (or Bertrand) competition among exporters, the
equilibrium farmer share is a decreasing function of relative exporter size, consistent with
Section 2.3.3. The shape of this function is determined by two key elasticities which govern
the heterogeneity of costs in the farmer’s choice problem. Intuitively, the more heterogeneous
are farmer costs, the greater the consequences of exporter market power. In this way, the
model also connects to the work of Costinot et al. (2016) and Sotelo (2020).
3.1 The value chain
The value chain consists of two agents: a continuum of farmers and a finite number of
exporters. Crops such as shrimp and cocoa are indexed by j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Each crop is
sold by an exogenous, finite number of exporters, indexed by i(j) ∈ {1, . . . , N(j)}. Each
exporter purchases the crop from farmers, adds some value, and sells it internationally. For
example, cocoa exporters may pack beans into bags or ship them across the country before
selling them abroad. Crops are produced by a continuum of farmers, indexed by f ∈ [0, 1].
Consistent with the empirical setting, farmers choose a single crop to produce and a single
exporter to supply, and exporters sell a single crop.16 Figure 4 summarizes the structure of
the model.
16These assumptions are not essential. Empirically, multi-product exporters are rare in Ecuador, and
farmers typically sell to a single exporter.
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Figure 4: Model structure
Exporter i(j):
max pxj xij − pijqij
Productivity zij ∼ H






Efficiency qf ∼ G
Yield qfij = eνfijqf








Notes: Endowments and technologies shown in white boxes. Model shocks shown in grey boxes. Optimization
and market clearing conditions shown in blue boxes. Black arrows denote optimization results. Blue text
denotes model parameters. See text for variable descriptions.
3.2 Farmer crop choices
Farmer f is endowed with a unit of land, which she farms inelastically with efficiency qf ∼ G.
The distribution of efficiencies qf is the only source of heterogeneity among farmers and
reflects differences in farmer productivity and land quality. She makes two decisions: which
crop to produce and which exporter to supply. She receives an idiosyncratic shock νcfj for
producing each crop j and an idiosyncratic shock νefi(j) for supplying each exporter i(j).
Since each exporter buys and sells a single crop, i(j) uniquely identifies an exporter. For
convenience, I drop the parentheses in subscripts, so that νefij becomes shorthand for νefi(j).








where η and θ are two key elasticities discussed in detail below. The idiosyncratic shocks
determine her yield: the higher are νcfj and νefij, the more she can supply if she chooses
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crop j and exporter i. In this sense, νcfj models the land’s suitability for growing crop j in
a stochastic way, while νefij models geographic proximity to exporter i in a stochastic way.
This will be important for interpreting the elasticities η and θ below.
Each exporter buys and sells a single product, offering price pij to all farmers. Farmers
trade off higher prices with lower idiosyncratic shocks: a shrimp exporter in the coastal
port of Guayaquil may pay a high price, but it does them little good if they happen to live
far away in the Ecuadorian Amazon, where the shock for producing shrimp and reaching
Guayaquil is prohibitively low. If the farmer chooses crop j and exporter i, she earns profits
pijqfij. She chooses a crop and exporter by solving:





The probability that farmer f chooses crop j and exporter i, Pr(fij), is independent of
her efficiency, qf .17 This implies that the model can accommodate any distribution of land
quality or farmer productivity. I assume νefij follows an extreme value distribution, and νcfj




1+η follows a Gumbell distribution (Cardell
1997).18 Under this assumption, Pr(fij) follows a nested logit structure: it can be written
as a product of the marginal probability of choosing crop j and the conditional probability
of choosing exporter i, conditional on choosing crop j:





Pr(f chooses exporter i|j)
×








Pr(f chooses crop j)
This expression has an intuitive interpretation: conditional on choosing crop j, the proba-
bility of choosing exporter i, Pr(i|j) depends on how large the price of exporter i (numerator)
is relative to the price index of crop j (denominator), which is a CES aggregate of prices
across exporters within a crop. The unconditional probability of choosing crop j, Pr(j), then
17See the appendix for a proof.













depends on how large the price index of crop j (numerator) is relative to the overall price
index (denominator), which is a CES aggregate of price indexes across crops.
If η > θ (McFadden 1978), the nested logit shocks have the interpretation that farmers
maximize profits by choosing a crop and an exporter conditional on each crop, a natural
nested choice. Although the theory does not require η > θ, the data will turn out to satisfy
this condition. I discuss the practical meaning of the condition in the next section.19
As η increases, the price becomes more important in determining whether a farmer
chooses exporter i, conditional on choosing crop j. In the limit, as η → ∞, the entire
market goes to the exporter with an infinitesimally higher price than the other exporters.
As η decreases, the price becomes less important. In the limit, as η → 0, the entire market
only goes to an exporter with an infinitely higher price. Similarly, as θ decreases, the price
index becomes less important in determining whether a farmer chooses crop j. As θ → 0,
even a crop with a low price index will attract some farmers. As θ increases, the price index
becomes more important. As θ → η, terms cancel and the problem collapses to a single
choice.

























price index, and Y = ∑i,j pijqij is total farmer income. It will be convenient to work with
the inverse supply curve:
19If instead θ > η, the nests are reversed, so that farmers choose an exporter and a crop conditional on
the exporter. While this may be reasonable in other contexts, it is not the case in Ecuador, where exporters

































3.3 Interpreting the elasticities η and θ
The model offers three intuitive interpretations of the parameters η and θ. First, θ governs
the correlation of crop-specific shocks. The higher is θ, the more correlated are the farmer’s
productivity draws across crops. Since her idiosyncratic productivity for two different crops is
likely to be similar, the prices of the crops will determine her choice. Intuitively, θ will be high
if the land is suitable for growing many different crops, so that there is little heterogeneity
in productivity. In Section 4.3, I relate my estimates of θ to a large literature that estimates
this heterogeneity directly. Finally, θ is the elasticity of substitution across crops in the CES
supply function. The higher is θ, the more substitutable are different crops from the point
of view of farmers. In a dynamic setting, higher substitutability would correspond to higher
rates of farmer switching across crops.
Similarly, η governs the correlation of exporter-specific shocks. The higher is η, the more
correlated are the farmer’s draws across exporters within a crop. Since her idiosyncratic
proximity to two different exporters is likely to be similar, the prices they offer will be more
important. If η is high, farmers will be able to reach many different exporters, and there
will be little heterogeneity in the cost of accessing exporters. In Section 4.3, I relate my
estimates of η to a large literature that estimates trade costs directly. Finally, the higher is
η, the more substitutable are exporters from a farmer’s point of view, and the more often a
farmer would switch exporters.
20See the appendix for a full derivation.
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Under these interpretations, the condition that η > θ can be interpreted in several ways:
a) idiosyncratic cost shocks are more strongly correlated across exporters than across crops;
b) there is more heterogeneity in the productivity of growing different crops than in the costs
of reaching different exporters; and c) exporters are more substitutable within crops than
across crops from the point of view of farmers. These are reasonable interpretations.
3.4 Exporter price setting
Each product j is exported by a set of exporters, which I take to be exogenous. Exporter
i purchases qij units of crop j from farmers, combines them with mij units of other inputs,
and exports xij units of the finished product. His production function is
xij = zijqαijm1−αij
where zij ∼ H is an idiosyncratic productivity term. This is the only source of ex-ante
heterogeneity across exporters within a given product.21
Exporters of product j exert market power over farmers, which I model as Cournot or
Bertrand competition for crops. When deciding what quantity to purchase (Cournot) or
what price to offer (Bertrand) for a crop, exporters form expectations about how farmers
respond. In other words, they internalize the upward sloping crop supply curve in Equations
2 (Cournot) and 1 (Bertrand): each additional unit they purchase increases the price of every
other unit. Because Cournot competition yields intuitive expressions for farmer shares at the
crop level (see Equation 7), I present the equilibrium under Cournot competition here and
show the equilibrium under Bertrand competition in the appendix. However, I will estimate
the model and perform measurement exercises under both forms of competition.
The domestic price of other inputs, pmj , and the international price of output, pxj , are
exogenous. Each exporter maximizes profits
21Throughout the paper, I assume constant returns to scale for exporters and market power only in the
market for crops. The theory and estimation can accommodate non-constant returns, as well as market power
in output and labor markets. Additional equilibrium conditions and moments necessary for estimation can
be derived from the first order conditions for inputs other than crops (Morlacco, 2019).
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maxqij ,mij{pxjxij − pijqij − pmj mij}















≡ ∂ log pij
∂ log qij is the (inverse) price elasticity of crop supply.
Equation 3 says that the farmer share defined in Section 2.3.2 depends on two things:
value added (captured by α) and market power (captured by εij). Under perfect competition,
1
εij
= 0, so that the farmer share of exporter revenue equals the output elasticity of crops, α.
When the exporter has market power, he internalizes the upward sloping supply of crops,
1
εij
> 0, and the farmer share is “marked down” from the perfectly competitive level. The
steeper the supply curve faced by the exporter (higher 1
εij
), the more market power he has,
the wider the markdown, and the lower the farmer share. Alternatively, the more value the
exporter adds to the crop (lower α), the lower the farmer share. These are exactly the two
explanations for low farmer shares discussed in Section 2.3.2.
3.5 Exporter market power in equilibrium
Given Cournot competition between exporters trying to procure crop j22 and the supply









22I assume no strategic interaction across crops, so that exporters of crop j take the price indexes of k 6= j
as given. This is reasonable given the large number of crops in Ecuador.
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where sij = pijqij∑
i(j) pijqij
is the relative size of exporter i in crop j as defined in Section 2.3.3.
In other words, the supply elasticity, εij, is the weighted harmonic mean of the elasticity of
substitution across crops, θ, and across exporters, η, where the relative sizes of exporters
form the weights.23 Substituting into Equation 3, the equilibrium farmer share is:








Since η > θ, Equation 5 implies a negative relationship between the farmer share and
the relative size of the exporter, precisely the relationship documented in Section 2.3.3. The
elasticity of substitution across crops, θ, and across exporters, η, determine the strength of
this relationship. Equation 5 therefore forges a connection between my stylized facts about
agricultural value chains and my theory of crop choice and exporter market power.
To make the connection between theory and data more explicit, take logs on both sides
of Equation 5. In addition, let the log output elasticity vary by exporter, with a crop-specific
and an idiosyncratic component: logαij = logαj + εij. Finally, take a linear approximation
of the log markdown. This yields the regression equation in Column 3 of Table 3:
log(farmer shareij) = logαj + log
η








sij + εij (6)
The size of the coefficient is informative of the difference between η and θ. However, I cannot
disentangle them with this regression alone, as the fixed effect contains both η and αj. In
Section 4.2, I discuss how the model allows me to estimate them separately. Furthermore,
I will show that my estimates of η and θ, together with Equation 6, are consistent with the
coefficients in Table 3.
23This is analogous to Atkeson and Burstein (2008), where the exporter-specific demand elasticity is a
weighted harmonic mean of the elasticities of substitution across and within nests from the point of view of
consumers and the weights are determined by exporter market shares of the output market.
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Aggregating 5 across exporters yields an intuitive expression for the crop-level farmer
share:














ij is the sum of squared exporter sizes, also known as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of market concentration. The inverse concentration index, HHI−1j , mea-
sures the effective number of exporters competing for crops. To illustrate, consider a market
with two exporters. If the exporters split the market, HHI−1j = 2, so that the market
is a duopsony. Instead, if one controls 99% of the market and the other controls 1%,
HHI−1j = 1.02, so that the market is effectively a monopsony. Equation 7 implies that
the lower the effective number of exporters for a given crop, the lower the crop-level farmer
share. This further links the theory to the data: the number of exporters is low in Figure 1,
while the farmer share is low in Figure 2.
Definition: Given a set of international prices for output {pxj }j, domestic prices for other
inputs {pmj }j, and parameters {α, η, θ}, an equilibrium is a vector of relative exporter sizes
{sij}i,j consistent with farmer optimization (Equation 2) and exporter optimization (Equa-
tion 5).
3.6 Special case: symmetric markets
To provide intuition on how market power operates in this setting, I consider the case of
symmetric exporters.24 The market for each crop is evenly divided among exporters, so that





24This occurs when all exporters of a given crop have the same productivity, zij = zj for every i(j).
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This implies that the (inverse) elasticity of crop supply 1
εj
is a weighted average of the
(inverse) elasticity of substitution across crops, 1
θ
, and the (inverse) elasticity of substitution
across exporters, 1
η
, where the weights are determined by the number of exporters competing
in the market, Nj. AsNj falls, we approach monopsony, and the substitutability across crops,
θ, receives more weight. As Nj increases, we approach monopsonistic competition, and the
substitutability across exporters within a crop, η, receives more weight. Since η > θ, the
supply elasticity εj increases as Nj increases, so that crop supply becomes more elastic.
Equation 8 then implies that the crop-level farmer increases, so that farmers receive a larger
share of export revenue.
Intuitively, if there are many exporters, then no single exporter exerts too much influence,
because farmers can always switch to other exporters of the same crop. On the other hand,
if a single exporter controls the market, then farmers can only switch to other crops. Since
it is easier for farmers to find a new exporter in the same crop than to plant a new crop
(η > θ), farmers will be more sensitive to prices when there are many exporters, so that
crop supply will be more elastic. The more elastic is supply, the lower is the markdown on
farmer shares. This captures the intuition that more competition among exporters is better
for farmers.
The symmetric case also highlights how η and θ influence market power. To illustrate,
fix the number of exporters, Nj, competing for a crop, so that the weights in Equation 8
are fixed. As the substitutability across exporters, η, increases, so does the supply elasticity,
εj. Intuitively, the number of outside options is constant, but the ability of farmers to
substitute between them increases. If outside options are more accessible, prices will play a
larger role in farmer decisions, so that supply will be more elastic. This captures the idea
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that more substitutability across exporters is better for farmers. A similar argument holds
for substitutability across crops, θ. Recall from Section 3.3 that an increase in η and θ can be
interpreted as a reduction in the costs of reaching different exporters and growing different
crops.
Proposition: Crop supply becomes more elastic, exporter market power falls, and the
crop-level farmer share rises as each of the following increases:
• The number of exporters competing for crop j, Nj
• The elasticity of substitution across exporters within crops, η
• The elasticity of substitution across crops, θ
4 Estimation
In the model, two key elasticities govern market power: the elasticity of substitution across
crops, θ, and the elasticity of substitution across exporters within a crop, η. In this section,
I estimate these elasticities using exporter responses to international demand shocks. I
validate the estimated model internally, by recreating the stylized fact from Section 2, and
externally, by comparing my estimates to values of η and θ implied by the agricultural trade
literature.
4.1 Identification using pass-through of demand shocks
Consider what happens when there is a sudden increase in the international price of crop
j. In order to expand exports and meet the growing demand, he must first purchase more
crops from farmers by offering a higher price. However, because he has market power and
internalizes the upward sloping supply curve for crops, he knows that each additional unit
raises the price of every other unit. As a result, he expands crop purchases by less than if
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his supply curve were flat. The more market power he has, the steeper his supply curve, and
the lower the pass-through of the demand shock to farmer income.25
To see this more formally, log-linearize around the equilibrium in Equation 5:














Constant returns to scale imply that log changes in crop exports are the sum of log changes
in crop quantities and log changes in exporter productivity: ∆ log xij = ∆ log zij + ∆ log qij.
Holding fixed the behavior of other exporters, the nested CES supply curve further implies
that log changes in exporter size can be expressed in terms of log changes in crop prices:
∆ log sij = (1 + η)(1− sij)∆ log pij. Substituting above and simplifying, we have:
∆ log pij =










×(∆ log pxj+∆ log zij) (9)
Clearly, η > θ implies that ρ < 1, so that pass-through is incomplete under market power. In
the appendix, I show that ρ is also decreasing in sij under this condition. Equation 9 implies
that for a given change in international prices, ∆ log pxj , the corresponding change in crop
price, ∆ log pij, will be smaller for relatively large exporters, provided that international price
shocks are orthogonal to exporter productivity shocks, ∆ log zij. This reflects the intuition
that pass-through declines with relative exporter size and forms the basis of my estimation
procedure.
In practice, strategic interaction among exporters implies that I cannot hold fixed the
behavior of other exporters. To illustrate, suppose a relatively large exporter purchases more
crops from farmers in response to an idiosyncratic demand shock. This acts as a negative
supply shock to the remaining exporters, so that they purchase fewer crops from farmers.
This, in turn, acts as a positive supply shock to the large exporter. The large exporter’s
desired increase in crop quantity therefore requires a smaller price increase than suggested
25This is analogous to a monopolist who faces a sudden decrease in marginal cost but does not pass it
through to consumers.
30
by his supply curve prior to the shock. The opposite is true for a small exporter: his
desired increase in crop quantity following a demand shock requires a larger price increase
than expected. Strategic interaction thus implies that pass-through declines more steeply
with exporter size, so that estimating η and θ from Equation 9, e.g. using Nonlinear Least
Squares, will yield biased results.
4.2 Estimation in the presence of strategic interaction
The model has three key parameters: the elasticity of substitution across exporters, η, the
elasticity of substitution across crops, θ, and the output elasticity of crops, α. Because of
strategic interaction, I recover them through indirect inference, implemented as Simulated
Method of Moments (SMM). Other parameters include: the means and standard deviations
of the distribution of exporter productivities, (µz, σ2z), and the distribution of demand shocks,
(µd, σ2d); the number of crops, M ; and the number of exporters in each market, {N(j)}j.
I estimate all parameters jointly, but outline the estimation procedure separately for each
group of parameters. Appendix A.3.2 provides further details.
4.2.1 Estimating η and θ
In order to take Equation 9 to the data, I estimate the following pass-through regression:
∆ log pijtqijt −∆ log xijt = δjt + βsij,t−1 + γ∆ log pxijt + ζsij,t−1 ×∆ log pxijt + εijt (10)
where εijt is an error term. The coefficient γ measures the average pass-through of the
demand shock, while the coefficient ζ measures how pass-through varies with exporter size.
As discussed above, these coefficients are informative of the elasticities η and θ. However,
because of strategic interaction among exporters, I use the full structure of the model to
back out the elasticities from pass-through coefficients.
I proceed in several steps: (1) estimate Equation 10 in the actual data, (2) simulate Equa-
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tion 10 in the model, (3) pick η and θ so that the coefficients γ and ζ from the model match
their counterparts in the data.26 In addition to being tractable, this procedure mitigates
the concern with under-reporting of purchases from farmers, as only differential changes in
under-reporting among exporters of different sizes would threaten the estimates.
In order to estimate Equation 10 in the data, I first construct the demand shocks. I
follow a standard Bartik specification combining exporter trade shares from my microdata
with international prices from COMTRADE:
∆ log pxijt =
∑
d λijd,t−1∆ log pxjdt
where d indicates a destination country, λijd,t−1 is the share of exporter i’s sales to that
country, and ∆ log pxjdt is the log change in price for imports of product j in the destination
country (excluding imports from Ecuador). Figure 15 in the appendix plots the distribution
of the shocks.
Table 4 displays the results of pass-through regressions using these shocks. Column 1
shows the baseline specification from Equation 10. Column 2 includes product and year fixed
effects to control for systematic differences across products and years. Column 3 controls for
time-varying exporter characteristics, as in Table 3. The coefficients, denoted γ̂ and ζ̂, are
consistent with the predictions in Section 4.1. Pass-through is incomplete (γ̂ < 1), and it
decreases with relative exporter size (ζ̂ < 0). The magnitudes in Column 3 imply that the
largest exporters increase farmer prices by only .355−.239
.355 = 32.7% as much as the smallest
exporters following an international price shock.
26Berger et al. (2019) estimate market power from the pass-through of demand shocks to producer prices
relative to quantities. I implement this approach in the appendix and obtain similar results.
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Table 4: Exporter responses to price shocks
∆ log pq −∆ log x ∆ log pq −∆ log x ∆ log pq −∆ log x
(1) (2) (3)
s 0.061 0.073 0.073
(0.054) (0.068) (0.073)
∆ log px 0.228 0.354 0.355
(0.118) (0.124) (0.124)
s×∆ log px -0.093 -0.226 -0.239
(0.256) (0.268) (0.269)
FE No Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes
Observations 767 767 767
R2 0.008 0.049 0.052
Notes: Column 1 shows estimates of pass-through regressions (Equation 10). Column 2 adds product and
year fixed effects. Column 3 adds time-varying controls described in text. Clustered standard errors are
shown in parentheses.
To estimate Equation 10 in the model, I proceed in several steps (see Appendix A.3.1
for further details). First, I draw the productivity of each exporter from the productivity
distribution described below. For each guess of η, θ, and the other parameters, I solve the
model. Next, I shock the model by drawing from the trade shock distribution described
below. I solve the model again to create a simulated panel. Finally, I estimate Equation
10 using the simulated panel. The resulting pass-through coefficients, denoted γ(η, θ) and
ζ(η, θ), are functions of η and θ.
I pick η and θ so that the pass-through coefficients estimated from the simulated data
match the coefficients estimated from the actual data and reported in Table 4:
(η̂, θ̂) = arg minη,θ
{
||γ̂ − γ(η, θ)||+ ||ζ̂ − ζ(η, θ)||
}
4.2.2 Estimating α
I pick α so that the overall farmer share generated by the model matches the farmer share
observed in the data. For each guess of α and the other parameters, I solve the model and
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calculate the crop-level farmer share from Equation 7:










where HHIj is taken from the simulated data. Let φ(α) denote the average farmer share. I
pick α so that φ(α) matches its counterpart in the data, denoted φ̂ and reported in Figure
2:
α̂ = arg minα ||φ̂− φ(α)||
4.2.3 Other parameters
I assume that (log) exporter productivity, log z, and price shocks, ∆ log px, follow normal
distributions:27
log z ∼ N(µz, σ2z) and ∆ log px ∼ N(µd, σ2d)
For exporter productivity, I choose (µz, σ2z) to match the distribution of log exporter revenue
in the data. For demand shocks, I choose (µd, σ2d) to match the distribution of log changes
in international prices in the data.
Finally, the number of crops, M , and the number of exporters for each crop, {Nj}j, are
chosen to match the histograms in Figure 1.
4.2.4 Parameter estimates
Table 5 summarizes the baseline estimated model under Cournot competition.28 The elas-
ticities of substitution across exporters, η, and across crops, θ, are small, indicating that
exporters face steep supply curves and exercise market power over farmers. The output
elasticity of crops, α, is large relative to the farmer share, further indicating a high degree
of market power. I explore the economic meaning of these estimates in detail below.
27In the appendix, I show how to estimate these non-parametrically.
28I estimate four additional versions of the model in the appendix. The first two are overidentified models,
where I match the relationship between farmer share and exporter size in addition to the price pass-through
moments. The last two are models where I construct moments from the relative pass-through to prices
vs. quantities, following Berger et al. (2019). I estimate each version under both Cournot and Bertrand
competition.
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Table 5: Parameter estimates
Parameter Estimate Moment Value
(a) Key parameters
η 1.72 Baseline pass-through, γ̂ 0.35
θ 0.35 Decline in pass-through with size, ζ̂ -0.23
α 0.51 Average farmer share, φ̂ 0.24
(b) Other parameters
µz 13.98 Terciles of log exporter revenue
σz 2.27
µd 0.02 Terciles of log price changes
σd 0.11
M 157 Number of crops
Nj 1-10 Number of exporters per crop
4.3 Model validation
I validate the model in several ways: internally, by comparing moments not targeted in the
estimation procedure between the model and the data; and externally, by comparing the
heterogeneity in production and transport costs implied by the model with estimates from
the agricultural trade literature.
4.3.1 Internal validation
Figure 5 plots the negative relationship between farmer share and relative exporter size, in
the model and in the data. The latter was first documented in Figure 3. The relationship
in the model, which is influenced by the parameters (η, θ, α), is somewhat flatter than in
the data, but the two slopes are not statistically distinguishable. Importantly, although the
average farmer share was targeted in estimation, the relationship between farmer shares and
exporter size is not targeted.
To further validate the model, I estimate Equation 6 and compare the results to Column
1 of Table 3. The coefficient on relative exporter size is slightly more negative at −0.87, but
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not statistically distinguishable. In the appendix, I estimate an overidentified version of the
model which matches this coefficient in addition to the coefficients from the pass-through
regression, and obtain similar results.














Notes: Figure plots relative exporter size on the x-axis and farmer shares of export value on the y-axis. Solid
blue line indicates predictions from the model. Dashed black line indicates predictions from the data. Grey
area indicates a 95% confidence interval.
The average farmer share targeted in the estimation is a function of the parameters
(η, θ, α) and the concentration index of exporters in each crop, HHIj. However, I did not
target the concentration index directly. Figure 6 plots the distribution of HHIj in the model
and in the data, weighted by total exports. Although the model generates somewhat higher
exporter concentration than the data, the distributions are similar. The weighted average
across all crops is 0.24 in the model and 0.19 in the data, indicating that crop markets
effectively have 4-5 exporters per crop.29
29The unweighted average, which is partially targeted by specifying the number of exporters per crop, is
0.58 in the model and 0.59 in the data.
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Notes: Figure plots the distribution of HHI across crops, weighted by the share of exports in each bin. Blue
bars indicate the model. Grey bars indicate the data.
4.3.2 External validation
I validate the model externally by comparing my estimates of θ and η to those implied
by the literature on agricultural production and trade in developing countries. Recall the
interpretation of θ in Section 3.3 as a measure of land heterogeneity: the higher is θ, the less
heterogeneous is the land, and the more suitable it is for producing different crops. Several
studies estimate this heterogeneity directly using data on land use and yields across crops.
In the appendix, I show how to calculate the land heterogeneity implied by my estimate
of θ. Figure 7 compares this value to those from the literature. They are generally larger
than my estimate of 1.35, indicating a smaller degree of heterogeneity than in my setting.
Importantly, I include the largest number of distinct products, which may explain why I find
more heterogeneity. Consistent with this explanation, Gouel and Laborde 2018 is both the
only other study to include animal products and the only study to find lower heterogeneity.
Sotelo 2020 finds a value similar to mine in Peru, the most agroclimactically similar country
to Ecuador among those studied.
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Figure 7: Estimates of land heterogeneity from the literature
Gouel & Laborde (2018)
Sotelo (2020)
Berguist et al (2019)
Farrokhi & Pellegrina (2020)
Costinot, Donaldson & Smith (2016)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Notes: Figure plots estimates of land heterogeneity from selected papers in grey, and the corresponding value
implied by θ̂ in blue. See text of Appendix A.3.8 for conversion details. See Table 13 for source details.
Finally, recall the interpretation of η in Section 3.3 as a measure of heterogeneity in
costs of reaching different exporters. To the best of my knowledge, no study estimates
this heterogeneity directly in an agricultural setting. However, a large literature estimates
iceberg trade costs across space. I show in the appendix that under some assumptions, my
estimate of η implies an average iceberg trade cost of 1.69. Figure 8 shows the average
estimated trade cost for several studies that focus on agriculture in developing countries.
They are generally smaller than my estimate, indicating lower trade costs on average. The
most comparable study is Chatterjee 2019, where trade costs allow local intermediaries in
India to exercise market power over farmers. Lacking the kind of spatial data he uses to
define each geographic market, I define a single market for each crop, which may explain
why my estimates are larger. On the other hand, my estimates are smaller than in Sotelo
2020, which uses spatial data from Peru, the country most geographically similar to Ecuador
among those studied.30
30The countries represented are Ethiopia, Nigeria, India, Ghana, Philippines, and Peru.
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Figure 8: Estimates of trade costs from the literature
Sotelo (2020)
Allen (2014)
Berguist et al (2019)
Chatterjee (2019)
Atkin & Donaldson (2015)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Notes: Figure plots estimates of trade costs from selected papers in grey, and the corresponding value implied
by η̂ in blue. See text of Appendix A.3.7 for conversion details. See Table 12 for source details.
5 Measurement
Armed with estimates of η and θ, I turn to interpreting them in my empirical context. First, I
use the actual data to calculate the implied markdowns faced by farmers in Ecuador. Second,
I conduct simulations to compare the level of farmer income between the estimated model
and a counterfactual in which exporters behave competitively, rather than strategically.
Finally, I decompose the aggregate effect of market power into different channels and examine
heterogeneity across crops.31
31Throughout this section, I use parameters estimated using the relative pass-through to prices vs. quan-
tities. See the appendix for estimation details and parameter values. These specfications yield the highest
estimates of market power (Cournot) and lowest estimates of market power (Bertrand). The other three
specifications – baseline Cournot, overidentified Cournot, and overidentified Bertrand – yield estimates in
between.
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5.1 Measuring crop markdowns in Ecuador
To explore the microeconomic impacts of market power, I combine parameter estimates with
value chain data in order to measure how much farmer prices are marked down from their
marginal revenue products. Rearranging Equation 5 yields an expression for this markdown









Panel A of Figure 9 plots the distribution of markdowns under Cournot competition, obtained
by plugging in the estimated η and θ and observed sij into Equation 11. The weighted average
is 0.49, implying that farmers receive around half of their marginal revenue product. While
the majority of exporters pay farmers 50-60% of their marginal product, some exporters,
including of important crops like coffee and palm, pay less than 30%.
Panel B plots the distribution of markdowns under Bertrand competition. As expected,
the distribution shifts to the right, indicating that exporters pay farmers a larger share of
their marginal revenue product and hence are more competitive. The weighted average is
only 0.53, so market power is still substantial.
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Notes: Figure plots the distribution of markdowns across exporters, weighted by the share of exports in each
bin. The dashed blue line depicts the average. Panel A assumes Cournot competition, and Panel B assumes
Bertrand competition.
5.2 What if markets were perfectly competitive?
To explore the aggregate implications of market power, I consider a counterfactual economy
in which exporters act competitively, rather than strategically. Under perfect competition,
exporters still face upward sloping crop supply curves, whose shapes are determined by the
parameters η and θ. However, they do not internalize their influence over the price, but
rather perceive a perfectly elastic supply curve, 1
εij
= 0. Crop prices are no longer marked
down from their marginal revenue product, so that farmers receive the perfectly competitive
farmer share, α.
This has two effects. First, farmers earn higher income for supplying the same crop to
the same exporter, since markdowns are eliminated across the entire sector. This is a pure
redistribution from exporters to farmers. However, there are also efficiency gains. In my
theory of crop choice, farmers trade off the price of a given exporter and a given crop with
their idiosyncratic shock for producing that crop and supplying that exporter. This implies
that some farmers do not produce the crop in which they are most productive, simply because
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its price index is too low. Conditional on a crop, some farmers do not supply the exporter
that is closest to them, simply because his price is too low. Removing market power lessens
this tradeoff and allows some farmers to produce their best crop and supply their closest
exporter. These are efficiency gains.
To quantify these channels, I first simulate the model with and without market power.
The total impact of market power is the log difference in farmer income between the two
scenarios. To measure the gains from redistribution, I calculate farmer income using quanti-
ties from the market power baseline and prices from the perfect competition counterfactual.








































where the superscript MP denotes the baseline with market power and PC denotes the
counterfactual with perfect competition.
Figure 10 displays the results of the decomposition. In Panel A, I assume Cournot
competition and find that farmer income would be 77.1% higher in the absence of market
power. Redistribution from exporters to farmers increases income by 50.7%, accounting
for almost two thirds of the gains.32 Greater efficiency accounts for the remaining third, a
25.6% increase in farmer income. In Panel B, I assume Bertrand competition. As expected,
the overall gains (66.1%) from perfect competition are lower, but the breakdown between
redistribution (43.4%) and efficiency (21.9%) is similar.
32In terms of welfare, redistribution represents a gain for farmers and a loss for exporters. If exporter profits
are rebated to farmers, the overall welfare gain may be small or even negative. However, this assumption in
unreasonable is this context.
42
Figure 10: Farmer income gains from perfect competition
(a) Cournot competition
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Notes: Figure shows percent increase in farmer income between model with market power and model with
perfect competition. Decomposition is described in text. Panel A assumes Cournot competition among
exporters. Panel B assumes Bertrand competition.
Although all farmers gain from perfect competition, the gains are not equally shared.
Panel A of Figure 11 shows how increases in farmer income vary with the baseline level of
crop market concentration, HHIj, under Cournot competition. Gains range from around
67% in relatively competitive crops, such as bananas, to 134% in the least competitive
crops, including cocoa. Both redistribution and efficiency gains increase with crop market
concentration, but redistribution increases proportionally more.
Panel B shows a similar pattern for Bertrand competition. Note, however, that the gains
are smaller than under Cournot competition for the least concentrated markets, but larger
for the most concentrated markets. This is related to the result that the Lerner Index is
linear in market shares under Cournot competition, but convex under Bertrand competition
(Alviarez, Head, and Mayer 2020).
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Notes: Figure plots the baseline HHI on the x-axis and the percent change in farmer income under perfect
competition on the y-axis. Panel A assumes Cournot competition, and Panel B assumes Bertrand competi-
tion.
6 Policy
Perfectly competitive markets are conceptually interesting, but they are a far cry from the
policies currently in place to curtail market power around the world. In this section, I
use the estimated model to examine two of the most common such policies: Fair Trade
certifications and mandated minimum prices. I conduct two counterfactual policy exercises
using the estimated model. I model Fair Trade as a perfectly competitive exporter in each
crop and show that this raises farmer income both directly and indirectly, by reducing the
market power of other exporters. In contrast, a price floor in each crop raises farmer income,
but increases the market power of some exporters, partially offsetting the direct effect. As
a result, Fair Trade is more effective in raising farmer incomes. Finally, I examine some
limitations of Fair Trade.33
33Throughout this section, I use parameters from the baseline model in Table 5, exactly identified from
price pass-through and assuming Cournot competition.
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6.1 Fair Trade
Fair Trade is a series of product certifications designed to foster the sustainable production
of commodities.34 Certified commodities include flowers, bananas, sugar, coffee, cocoa, and
other fruits and vegetables. Similar certifications exist for fish and meat. In order for a
product to be certified, both exporters and producers must meet certain criteria. Exporters
agree to pay a minimum price that covers the cost of sustainable farming, as well as a
Fair Trade premium typically earmarked for further investment in farming communities.
In return, farmers guarantee safe working conditions and sound environmental practices.
Because these guarantees are costly, only a subset of producers are Fair Trade certified. For
coffee – the largest product in the Fair Trade market – less than 40% of available quantity is
certified. In my analysis, I abstract from the non-monetary benefits and costs of selection.35
Outside of bananas and flowers, Fair Trade is not prevalent in Ecuador. I model Fair
Trade by introducing a perfectly competitive exporter in each market. In addition to being
tractable, this flexibly captures the many ways Fair Trade works in practice (Podhorsky
2015). The Fair Trade exporter faces the same supply curve as other exporters, but pays
farmers their marginal revenue product. One reason the Fair Trade exporter is able to pay
higher prices is that it has access to buyers who are willing to pay a premium for Fair Trade
branded products (Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Sequeira 2015). Alternatively, the Fair Trade
exporter can represent a cooperative that allows farmers to export directly (Bacon, Mendez,
and Stuart 2008). Since farmers own the cooperative, they internalize markdowns.36
A new exporter would increase competition and force other exporters to raise prices,
even if he behaved strategically. That he instead behaves competitively, and therefore pays
34See Dragusanu et al. (2014) for a comprehensive survey of Fair Trade certifications and research.
35The net effect of selection is unclear. Higher quality farmers may face lower costs of certification, so
that there is positive selection (Dragusanu and Nunn 2018). In this case, my model will underestimate the
gains. On the other hand, lower quality farmers may perceive higher benefits from certification, so that
there is negative selection (Ruben and Fort 2012). In that case, my model will overestimate the gains. For
a theoretical model that incorporates selection, see Podhorsky (2015).
36In addition to paying higher prices, buyers provide access to credit in order to overcome the fixed costs
of exporting.
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a higher price conditional on his productivity, further raises prices. Fair Trade therefore
has a positive direct and indirect effect on prices. These effects reflect the primary goals of
Fair Trade: increasing prices and improving bargaining power among farmers. Furthermore,
their importance has been documented both theoretically (Podhorsky 2015) and empirically
(Dragusanu and Nunn 2018).
The overall effect of Fair Trade depends on the productivity of the new exporter. The
more productive he is, the higher the price he can offer to farmers, and the more of the
market he can pull away from exporters with market power. Figure 12 summarizes how
the increase in farmer income varies with how productive the Fair Trade exporter is relative
to other exporters. The blue solid line shows that even a Fair Trade exporter with the
median productivity level increases farmer income by 12%.37 As the new exporter becomes
among the most productive in the economy, the gains increase to 25%, or about one third
of the gains from perfect competition in Figure 10. These gains are quantitatively similar to
causal estimates from the coffee sector (De Janvry et al. 2015; Dragusanu and Nunn 2018;
Macchiavello and Miquel-Florensa 2019), but apply to a much broader range of products.
To get a sense of the indirect and direct effects of the Fair Trade exporter, I estimate how
farmer income would change if the new exporter behaved strategically. The dashed black
line indicates that the gains from Fair Trade are driven by the direct effect on participating
farmers.
37The Fair Trade exporter purchases around 20% of crop quantity – within the ballpark of what is typically
certified.
46



























Notes: Figure plots the productivity quantile of a counterfactual exporter on the x-axis and the resulting
percent change in farmer income relative to the baseline model on the y-axis. The dashed black line indicates
the counterfactuals in which the exporter has market power. The solid blue line indicates the Fair Trade
counterfactual in which the exporter is perfectly competitive.
6.2 Minimum prices
A common alternative to Fair Trade is for governments to set a price floor across all exporters
of a given product. In Ecuador, bananas and palm are the only exported products with
price floors (Cunha et al. 2019). Minimum price support is growing, especially for exported
commodities in developing countries (Anderson 2009). Compared to conditional subsidies,
these policies are relatively cheap to implement, but create more distortions.
To illustrate how price floors affect the equilibrium, consider exporters for whom the
minimum price is binding. These exporters move along their supply curves. If they are
productive enough that they can still earn profits, they will pay the minimum price and
purchase more crops at a lower markdown. If they are not productive enough to earn
positive profits moving along their supply curves, they will pay the minimum price and
purchase fewer crops until the marginal revenue product equals the minimum price. This
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increases the market power of more productive firms and undoes some of the positive price
effects. The strength of these effects depends crucially on the level of the minimum price.
If the minimum price is low, most exporters will be able to pay, and the net effect will be
positive.38 As the minimum price becomes too high, no exporters can afford to pay, and
demand contracts so much that farmers may be worse off.
Figure 13 summarizes how the increase in farmer income varies with how high the floor
is relative to the distribution of prices. The blue solid line shows the gains from a Fair Trade
exporter with the median productivity level. The dashed black line implies that in order for a
price floor to achieve the same gains, it would have to be near the 75th percentile of the price
distribution – an extraordinarily high value. Fair Trade implements a price floor without
distorting the behavior of smaller exporters (Podhorsky 2015), making it more effective for
raising farmer income.




























Notes: Figure plots the quantile of a counterfactual price floor on the x-axis and the resulting percent
change in farmer income relative to the baseline model on the y-axis. The dashed black line indicates the
counterfactuals with a price floor. The solid blue line indicates the Fair Trade counterfactual in which the
exporter has median productivity (See Figure 12).
38This is analogous to a minimum wage increasing employment in the presence of labor market power
(Berger et al. 2019).
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6.3 Do farmers benefit from globalization?
So far, I have only discussed differences in farmer income across equilibria, comparing scenar-
ios with perfectly competitive intermediaries, Fair Trade entrants, and mandated minimum
prices against the baseline model with unrestricted market power. Now, I fix an equilibrium
and ask what happens to farmer income as international prices change. For each counter-
factual equilibrium – perfect competition, Fair Trade, minimum price – I begin with the
simulated cross-section from the corresponding section above. Then, I draw shocks from the
distribution of international price changes (Table 5) and solve the model again to create a
simulated panel. For the equilibrium with market power, I use the actual data
Figure 14 shows the percent increase in farmer income following a 100% increase in the
international price. There are several key takeaways. First, farmer income increases by less
than 50% in the baseline with market power. Farmer income increases less under Fair Trade
and less still when under a price floor. This is consistent with Fair Trade reducing exporter
market power more than minimum prices. Finally, pass-through is perfect when exporters
are competitive, so that farmer income increases 1 for 1 with international prices.
These results highlight a trade-off inherent to agricultural support policies, complicating
the conclusions of previous sections. Compared to Fair Trade, farmer income is lower on
average when there is a price floor, but it is also less responsive to shocks. Farmer income
is even lower and less responsive in the baseline with market power. Farmers benefit less
from future gains, but they also suffer less from future losses. Fair Trade therefore reduces
the insurance provided by exporter market power, increasing farmer income on average but
potentially leaving them more vulnerable to future shocks.
The model allows me to quantify how risk averse farmers would have to be to prefer the
lower income and lower risk they face under minimum prices. In Figure 13, farmer income
is approximately 6% higher when the minimum price equals the median from the baseline
model, and 12% higher when there is a Fair Trade exporter with the median productivity
level from the baseline model. In Figure 14, the pass-through of an international price shock
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to farmer income is 78% with a minimum price and 91% with Fair Trade. In the appendix,
I show that these numbers imply a coefficient of relative risk aversion around 2. This is
within the range of estimates from a large sample of developing countries (Gandelman and
Hernandez-Murillo, 2014).
In contrast, farmers would have to be unreasonably risk averse to prefer the baseline with
market power. The pass-through of an international price shock to farmer income is only
42% with market power. At the same time, farmer income is 69% higher under Fair Trade.
This implies a coefficient of relative risk aversion of almost 5.5, which is high even among
experimental estimates of risk aversion among farmers in Ethiopia (Yesuf and Bluffstone,
2009).
Figure 14: Pass-through of price shocks to farmer income





Percent change in farmer income
Notes: Figure shows average percent change in farmer income following a 100% increase in international
prices. “Market Power” refers to the data in Section 4.2. “Competitive” refers to the model in Section 5.2.
“Fair Trade” refers to the model in Section 6.1, with exporter productivity equal to the median productivity




Recent decades have seen the rise of both concentration and globalization. Understanding the
consequences of concentration is especially important in the agricultural sector in emerging
economies, where globalization offers millions of farmers a path out of poverty. I show that
these consequences are large in the context of export value chains in Ecuador.
To overcome the challenge of measuring inequality in value chains, I link three adminis-
trative data sources. Customs microdata capture exporter revenue, VAT microdata capture
exporter payments to suppliers, and firm registry data identify which suppliers are farm-
ers. I exploit the unique network structure of my dataset to document that farmers earn
significantly less if they sell to an exporter who dominates the market for a crop.
To quantify the importance of market power, I develop a model in which farmers choose
a crop to produce and an exporter to supply. The more costly it is for farmers to switch
crops or switch exporters within a crop, the more that farmer shares fall with exporter
size. The elasticities of substitution across crops and across exporters within a crop are
therefore crucial to measuring market power. I develop a method to estimate them using
exporter responses to international price shocks. The estimated model implies that farmers
in products as diverse as fruit and fish receive a fraction of their marginal revenue products.
Despite the prevalence of market power, globalization can still provide farmers a path
out of poverty. Fair Trade increases farmer income substantially while avoiding the distor-
tions created by more common policies like minimum support prices. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests that even a modest Fair Trade program implemented across the agricul-
tural sector in Ecuador could raise 13% of poor farmers out of poverty.39 However, increasing
farmer income today may make farmers more vulnerable to economic shocks tomorrow. Fur-
ther research is needed to understand the tradeoffs between greater prosperity and higher
uncertainty.
39See the appendix for details.
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7.1 Future work
This dissertation provides a blueprint for bringing high resolution tax data to bear on the
study of imperfect competition. The increasing availability of such data worldwide, es-
pecially in emerging economies, will allow researchers to examine the division of surplus
between buyers and sellers in many other markets. In ongoing work, I use linked employer-
employee data and buyer-supplier data to simultaneously measure the market power of large
firms over workers and suppliers. The balance between these two types of market power
determines whether antitrust policy or labor market regulations will be more effective for
fighting inequality.
The methods I develop in this dissertation connect cutting edge models of imperfect
competition and agricultural production, opening the door for future work at the intersection
of these fields. The elasticities of substitution I estimated from variation in pass-through line
up with those estimated by others from geospatial and agroclimactic variation. Together with
the distribution of exporter market shares, they are sufficient for measuring markdowns. In
another project, I combine estimates of the former (from the FAO) with data on the latter
(from the World Bank) to measure market power at a micro level across more than 50
developing countries.
This dissertation leaves open the crucial question of why export markets are so concen-
trated in the first place. Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) to trade, such as quality standards for
agricultural products, change the structure of international markets by forcing some buyers
and sellers to exit. In joint work with researchers at the World Bank and United Nations, I
combine microdata on the universe of exporters and importers across seven Latin American
countries with data on all NTBs implemented in Latin America over 20 years. Together,
these data allow me to observe both sides of international markets, as well as the most
important restrictions affecting those markets, for the first time ever.
Preliminary results suggest that following the implementation of a new NTB, the num-
ber of exporters in a market falls relative to the number of importers, and import prices
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rise. These differences persist for years, potentially increasing exporter bargaining power in
addition to product quality. Going forward, I will exploit the firm-level richness of the data
to distinguish between these two channels, shedding futher light on the forces that shape




A.1.1 Additional network statistics
Table 6 summarizes the network of exporters and farmers across 2-digit products.
Table 6: Value chain statistics by product
2-digit Product No. Exporters No. Farmers
Live animals 3 3
Fish and crustaceans 180 8,650
Dairy produce 6 1,406
Other animal products 4 23
Live plants 476 1,153
Vegetables 44 2,162
Fruit and nuts 301 11,301
Coffee, tea, spices 33 2,486
Cereals 22 6,446
Mill products 7 50
Oil seeds 20 159
Vegetable extracts 2 2
Other vegetable products 8 36
Animal or vegetable fats and oils 25 17,909
Meat and fish preparations 43 2,533
Sugars and sugar confectionery 11 3,724
Cocoa and cocoa preparations 77 25,336
Cereal preparations 12 1,299
Vegetable and fruit preparations 47 7,988
Other preparations 14 2,827
Beverages 16 1,157
Waste from the food industries 31 4,159
Tobacco products 16 999
Notes: Table shows number of exporters and farmers for each 2-digit product.
A.1.2 Robustness of stylized facts
Table 7 shows a linear specification of the stylized fact in Table 3. Given the unweighted
average farmer share of around 0.2, the coefficient of -0.104 in Column 3 is consistent with
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the 53% lower farmer shares among large exporters reported in Table 3.
Table 7: Farmer shares and exporter concentration
Farmer Share Farmer Share Farmer Share Farmer Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative Exporter Size -0.101 -0.108 -0.104 -0.109
(0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021)
FE No Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes
Weights No No No Yes
Observations 1,923 1,923 1,923 1,923
R2 0.021 0.325 0.418 0.585
Notes: Column 1 shows regression of farmer shares on relative exporter size. Column 2 adds product-year
fixed effects. Column 3 adds time-varying controls described in text. Column 4 weights each observation by
the share of total exports. Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses.
A.2 Theory appendix
A.2.1 Derivation of CES supply curve




1+η across i and j. The maximum satisfies
yij > ykl for all k and l. For any k and l, the terms log qf on both sides of the inequality
cancel, so that the maximum is independent of farmer capacity.
The expected quantity supplied by farmer f to exporter i of crop j is qfij = qf ×Pr(fij).



























Multiplying both sides by pij and summing across crops and exporters, we have Y =∑
i,j pijqij, so that Y is total spending by exporters on crops.






























































Y , it is straight-
forward to show that PQ = Y . This implies that X = Y
P 1+θ
. Substituting into the supply
curves yields the expressions in the main text.
A.2.2 Bertrand competition
Given Bertrand competition between exporters trying to procure crop j and the supply curve
in Equation 1, the supply elasticity has the following closed form:
εij = η(1− sij) + θsij (12)
where sij is the relative size of exporter i in crop j. In other words, the supply elasticity, εij,
is the weighted mean of the elasticity of substitution across crops, θ, and across exporters,
η, where the relative sizes of exporters form the weights. Substituting into Equation 3, the
equilibrium farmer share is:
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farmer shareij = α×
1 + 1
η(1− sij) + θsij
−1 (13)
Since η > θ, Equation 13 implies a negative relationship between the farmer share and
the relative size of the exporter, just like Equation 5. Aggregating across exporters yields
the crop-level farmer share:




η(1− sij) + θsij
−1 (14)
This equation is analogous to 7, but difficult to interpret without an analog to the HHI.
One can show that for any η 6= θ, the markdown under Bertrand competition:1 + 1
η(1−sij)+θsij
−1
is greater than the markdown under Cournot competition:1 + 1
η
(1− sij) + 1θsij
−1
One can further show that for η > θ, the pass-through of an international price change is
lower under Cournot. For a given η, θ, and sij, Bertrand competition clearly implies less
market power among exporters.
The implications of Bertrand competition for estimating market power are less clear.
Given the relationship between pass-through and exporter size in the data, Bertrand com-
petition will yield smaller estimates of η and θ than Cournot competition, indicating steeper
supply curves and hence more market power. However, given η, θ, and the distribution of
farmer shares in the data, Bertrand competition will also yield smaller estimates of α than
Cournot competition, indicating narrower markdowns and hence less market power. These
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counteracting forces explain how Bertrand competition can simultaneously yield lower es-
timates of the market power parameters η and θ and smaller gains from removing market
power.
A.2.3 Pass-through of international price changes
Taking the derivative with respect to pxj of the log-linearized equilibrium in equation 9 and








Clearly, pass-through is incomplete as long as η > θ. In addition, one can show that pass-
through is lower on average for larger exporters.
First, note that the derivative of the pass-through as a function of exporter market size




















For exporter size near 0, this expression is negative and large in absolute value. For exporter
size near 1, this expression is positive but small in absolute value. Pass-through declines
rapidly as size increases near 0, but only increases slowly as size increases near 1. This
suggests that pass-through is lower on average among larger exporters.
Next, recall from Section 4.1 that because of strategic interaction among exporters, the
data do not reveal the partial equilibrium pass-through. Strategic interaction makes small
exporters more responsive to price shocks and large exporters less responsive in general
equilibrium. In other words, the partial equilibrium pass-through underestimates the general
equilibrium pass-through for small exporters and overestimates it for large exporters. This
magnifies the decline in pass-through in the previous paragraph.














(1− sij) + 1θsij
)−1
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The first term is the price pass-through, which is less than 1 and declines with exporter size.
The term in parentheses can be greater or less than 1, so there is no clear prediction for
average quantity pass-through. However, since η > θ, this term increases with exporter size,
so that quantity pass-through unambiguously declines with size.
I test the predictions for quantity pass-through by estimating the following regression:
∆ log xijt = δjt + βsij,t−1 + γ∆ log pxijt + ζsij,t−1 ×∆ log pxijt + εijt (15)
where the terms are defined as in Equation 10. Table 8 displays the results of different
specifications analogous to those of Table 4. As predicted by the theory, quantity pass-
through decreases significantly with size. Furthermore, quantity pass-through is substantially
lower than price pass-through. The positive correlation between price responses in Table 4
and quantity responses in Table 8 support the interpretation of international price shocks
as demand shocks for exporters. By shifting the demand curve for exporters, these shocks
trace out their supply curves and identify buyer market power.
Table 8: Quantity responses to price shocks
∆ log x ∆ log x ∆ log x
(1) (2) (3)
s -0.138 0.001 0.130
(0.103) (0.131) (0.139)
∆ log px 0.055 0.014 0.063
(0.226) (0.238) (0.237)
s×∆ log px -0.575 -0.685 -0.735
(0.493) (0.516) (0.514)
FE No Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes
Observations 767 767 767
R2 0.005 0.047 0.062
Notes: Column 1 shows estimates of pass-through regressions (Equation 15). Column 2 adds product and




A.3.1 Solving the model
To solve the model, I first guess crop market shares. Then, I solve for scaled crop supply
elasticities and prices and use the prices to update market shares, iterating until the shares
converge. Finally, I rescale to obtain crop prices and quantities. For a vector of parameters
(η, θ, α) and a draw of productivities {zij}, the algorithm is as follows:
• Guess equal market shares sij = 1Nj
• Scaled equilibrium














– Iterate until market shares converge
• Unscaled equilibrium






1+η , p̂ = (∑j p̂1+θj ) 11+θ
– Re-scale prices pij = p̂ij × p̂θ






1+η , p = (∑j p1+θj ) 11+θ





A.3.2 Simulated Method of Moments
I estimate (η, θ, α) via Simulated Method of Moments. The details are as follows:
• Guess (η, θ, α). Draw productivities log zij ∼ N(µz, σ2z). Solve model and treat as data
with t = 1.
• Draw shocks ∆ log pxijt ∼ N(µp, σ2p). Solve model again and treat as data with t = 2.
• Estimate regressions in the simulated data
∆ log pijt = δjt + βsij,t−1 + γ∆ log pxijt + ζsij,t−1 ×∆ log pxijt + εijt
• Estimate regressions in the real data
∆ log pijtqijt −∆ log xijt = δ̂jt + β̂sij,t−1 + γ̂∆ log pxijt + ζ̂sij,t−1 ×∆ log pxijt + ε̂ijt
• Calculate farmer shares in the simulated data




















• Pick (η, θ, α) to minimize
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣γ̂ − γ(α, η, θ)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ζ̂ − ζ(α, η, θ)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣φ̂− φ(α, η, θ)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣.
I perform the optimization using a Multi Level Single Linkage (MLSL) global algorithm
with a Nelder-Mead local minimizer, as implemented by the NLOPTR package in R. This
algorithm has been shown to perform well for Simulated Method of Moments (Arnoud,
Guvenen, and Kleineberg 2019).
61
A.3.3 Specifying demand shocks
Figure 15 plots the distributions of demand shocks under two different specifications of the
shift-share design described in Section 4.2. Both specifications use shares of export revenue by
destination. The first, shown in blue, uses shifts in import prices at the destination (excluding
imports from Ecuador). It is well-approximated by a normal distribution with mean 0.02
and standard deviation 0.11. The second, shown in black, uses shifts in import expenditures
at the destination (again excluding imports from Ecuador). This generates substantially
more dispersion in demand shocks, and is well-approximated by a normal distribution with
mean 0.05 and standard deviation 0.15. When solving the model, I can draw price shocks
directly from the distributions in the data. For the sake of reproducibility, I draw from the
fitted normal distributions instead.














Notes: Solid blue line plots density of percent change in international prices. Dashed black line plots density
of percent change in international expenditures.
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A.3.4 Recovering exporter productivities
When estimating the model, I pick the mean and standard deviation of log exporter produc-
tivity to match the distribution of log exporter revenue in the data. However, it is possible to
recover exporter productivities non-parametrically following the procedure in Berger et al.

















where I have suppressed the j subscript and ψ(si) = (1 + 1εi )
−1 is the optimal markdown as








1+η . Substituting above and rearranging yields a simple expression





This equation says that a more productive exporter (higher zi) pays farmers a lower
markdown relative to his size (lower ψ(si)/si). Intuitively, more productive exporters in
the model are both larger and pay lower markdowns, so it is reasonable to infer relative
productivity from relative markdowns and relative sizes.
A.3.5 Overidentified model
In this section, I estimate an overidentified version of the model under both Cournot and
Bertrand competition. I proceed as in Section 4.2, with one important modification. In
addition to matching the baseline pass-through (γ in Equation 10), the decline in pass-
through with exporter size (ζ in Equation 10), and the average farmer share, I match the
decline in farmer share with exporter size (β in Equation 6). The theory implies that this
coefficient is a function of η and θ, as discussed in Section 3.5. Furthermore, it is precisely
estimated in Table 3, unlike the coefficient on the interaction term in Table 4. This will be
particularly helpful for estimating θ.
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To estimate the model under Bertrand competition, I make two modifications to the
estimation procedure in Section 4.2. First, I compute the optimal farm price using the
Bertrand supply elasticity (Equation 12) rather than the Cournot supply elasticity (Equation
4). Second, I choose the output elasticity α to match the Bertrand farmer share (Equation
14) rather than the Cournot farmer share (Equation 7).
Table 9 presents estimates of the key parameters. The overidentified model features
stronger potential market power than the baseline model in the form of lower elasticities of
substitution η and θ. However, the actual market power implied by the output elasticity α
is similar to that of the baseline model. Note that the Cournot model matches all moments
well, despite being overidentified. However, the Bertrand model struggles to generate both
the steep decline in pass-through and the steep decline in farmer shares as a function of
exporter size.
Table 9: Key parameters, overidentified model




η 1.68 1.26 γ̂ 0.35 0.36 0.44
θ 0.37 0.30 (ζ̂ , β̂) (-0.23,-0.82) (-0.22,-0.83) (-0.16,-0.89)
α 0.51 0.51 φ̂ 0.24 0.24 0.24
A.3.6 Estimating η and θ from relative pass-through
In this section, I estimate the model using an alternative estimation technique and an al-
ternative specification of demand shocks. Berger et al. (2019) estimate the elasticity of
substitution across firms, η, and markets, θ, using the relative pass-through of demand
shocks to prices and quantities, rather than just pass-through to prices. Taking the ratio of
pass-through to crop prices and quantities above yields the crop supply elasticity:
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∂ log pij/∂ log pxj







Letting sij → 0, we have that the supply elasticity of small exporters identifies η. Letting
sij → 1, we have that the supply elasticity of large exporters identifies θ. Following Berger
et al. (2019), I pick η and θ so that exporter responses to shocks as a function of relative
size, denoted by ξ(sij) ≡
d log pij/d log pxj
d log qij/d log pxj
, match between the model and the data. I proceed in
several steps: (1) estimate ξ̂(s) in the data, (2) simulate ξ(s) in the model, (3) form moments
from ξ̂(s) and ξ(s), (4) minimize the distance between the moments.
To estimate ξ̂(s) in the data, I first estimate the following regressions:
∆ log pijtqijt = δvjt + βvsij,t−1 + γv∆ log pxijt + ζvsij,t−1 ×∆ log pxijt + εvijt (17)
∆ log xijt = δqjt + βqsij,t−1 + γq∆ log pxijt + ζqsij,t−1 ×∆ log pxijt + ε
q
ijt (18)
where v stands for “value” and q stands for “quantity.” All other terms are defined as in
Equation 10. Equation 17 represents the expenditure response to international price shocks,
while Equation 18 represents the quantity response. I use Equation 17 rather than Equation
10 to avoid including quantity responses in both dependent variables. When constructing
demand shocks following the shift-share design in Section 4.2, I use the log change in import
expenditures at the destination rather than the log change in import prices.







Table 10 displays the regression results. As above, the estimated coefficients imply that
(a) pass-through is imperfect, (b) pass-through declines with exporter size, and (c) shocks
shift the demand curve and trace out the supply curve. The last two rows of Table 10
report the supply elasticities implied by the estimates for relatively small exporters, ξ̂(0),
and relatively large exporters, ξ̂(1). Notice that larger exporters indeed face steeper supply
curves.
Table 10: Exporter responses to expenditure shocks
∆ log pq ∆ log x
(1) (2)











Notes: Column 1 shows estimates of Equation 17. Column 2 shows estimates of Equation 18. ξ̂(0) and ξ̂(1)
were calculated using Equation 19. Both specifications include product and year fixed effects. Clustered
standard errors are shown in parentheses.
To simulate ξ(s) in the model, I proceed as above, guessing η and θ, solving the model,
66
shocking the model, solving again, estimating Equations 17 and 18 in the simulated data,
and calculating ξ(s; η, θ) using Equation 19. Notice that the supply elasticity in the model
depends on η and θ.
The crop supply elasticity faced by relatively small exporters identifies η,while the supply
elasticity faced by relatively large exporters identifies θ. Therefore, I pick η and θ so that
the elasticities ξ(0; η, θ) and ξ(1; η, θ) generated by the model match the elasticities ξ̂(0) and
ξ̂(1) estimated from the data and reported in Table 10:
(η̂, θ̂) = arg minη,θ
{
||ξ̂(0)− ξ(0; η, θ)||+ ||ξ̂(1)− ξ(1; η, θ)||
}
Table 11 reports the three key parameters of the model estimated using the relative
pass-through of demand shocks, which I will call the Berger-Herkenhoff-Mongey procedure.
Notice that this procedure implies higher market power than the procedure in the main text:
the estimated η and θ are lower, while the estimated α is higher.
Table 11: Key parameters, Berger-Herkenhoff-Mongey procedure
Parameter Cournot Bertrand Moment Value
η 1.32 1.31 ξ̂(0) 0.79
θ 0.34 0.33 ξ̂(1) 1.33
α 0.55 0.49 φ̂ 0.24
A.3.7 External validation of η
To compare exporter-specific cost shocks in my model to those in the agricultural trade
literature, assume there is a single crop, so that the only relevant shock is νfi1+η . A farmer
with efficiency qf delivers e
νfi
1+η qf = exqf units to exporter i, where x follows a Gumbel
distribution with scale parameter 11+η . In addition, assume that trade costs are the only
source of heterogeneity in exporter-specific costs. In the literature, trade costs are typically
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deterministic and takes an iceberg form. As a result, I compare the mean trade cost estimates
from the literature to the mean implied by my estimates, expressed in iceberg form.
Following the derivation above, the Gumbel distribution with scale parameter 11+η is
equivalent to the Frechet distribution with scale parameter 1 + η . The mean of a Frechet
distribution with scale parameter 1 + η is Γ(1 − 11+η ), where Γ(·) is the gamma function.
Substituting my estimate of η = 1.72 yields a mean of 1.42. To convert this to iceberg
form, I divide the 90th percentile of the Frechet distribution by the average, yielding an
average trade cost of 1.69. The following table reports this estimate, along with those from
a selection of papers.
Table 12: Sources for Figure 8
Reference Iceberg trade cost Source
Atkin and Donaldson 2015 1.12 Section 4.3
Chatterjee 2019 1.16 Section 6.1.1
Bergquist et al. 2019 1.25 Section 4
Allen 2014 1.47 Table 7
This paper 1.69 Section A.3.7
Sotelo 2020 2.34 Reported in Table
4
A.3.8 External validation of θ
To compare crop-specific productivity shocks in my model to those in the agricultural trade
literature, assume there is a single exporter for each crop, so that the only relevant shock is
νfj
1+θ . A farmer with efficiency qf now produces e
νfj
1+θ qf = exqf units of crop j, where x follows a
Gumbel distribution with scale parameter 11+θ . In the literature, land heterogeneity typically
follows a Frechet distribution with shape parameter θ̃. It remains to convert the cost shock
to a productivity shock, and the Gumbel parameter to the associated Frechet parameter.
Rewrite the cost shock z = ex. The CDF of z is G(z) = P (ex ≤ z) = P (x ≤ log z) =
F (log z) , where F is the CDF of x. Substituting log z into the CDF for the Gumbel
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distribution, we obtain the CDF of the Frechet distribution with shape parameter 1 + θ
. Therefore, my estimate of θ̂ = 0.35 corresponds to a shape parameter of 1.35 for the
distribution of land heterogeneity. The following table reports this estimate, along with
those from a selection of papers.




Costinot et al. 2016 2.46 Table 2
Farrokhi and Pellegrina 2020 2.05 Table 2
Bergquist et al. 2019 1.80 Section 4
Sotelo 2020 1.66 Section 5
This paper 1.34 Section A.3.8
Gouel and Laborde 2018 1.2 Section 6.2
A.4 Measurement appendix
A.4.1 External validation of markdowns
Figure 14 situates my estimated markdowns within the broader literature on buyer market
power. Although studies of buyer power differ widely in empirical context and modeling
choices,40 they all employ markdowns as a measure of market power. Most of these stud-
ies estimate considerably higher markdowns, meaning that buyers have less market power
than in my setting. However, the most directly comparable study, Rubens (2020), which
estimates the market power of cigarette manufacturers over tobacco farmers in China, finds
lower markdowns. Moreover, several of these studies focus on workers in US labor markets
(Lamadon et al. 2019; Berger et al. 2019; Azar et al. 2019), who are likely more mobile than
farmers in Ecuador.
40For example, Lamadon et al. (2019); Berger et al. (2019); Azar et al. (2019) take three different ap-
proaches to study market power in US labor markets.
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Figure 16: Estimates of markdowns from the literature
Rubens (2020)
Morlacco (2019)
Berger, Herkenhoff & Mongey (2019)
Azar, Berry & Marinescu (2019)
Lamadon, Mogstad & Setzler (2019)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Notes: Figure plots average markdown from selected papers in grey, and my average markdown under
Cournot competition in blue. See Table 14 for source details.
In Section 5.1, I calculate the average markdown of farmer prices relative to marginal
revenue products implied by the estimated model and data on exporter sizes. The following
table reports this estimate, along with those from a selection of papers.




Lamadon et al. 2019 0.85 Section 6.1
Azar et al. 2019 0.83 Section 4.1
Berger et al. 2019 0.74 Figure 8
Morlacco 2019 0.51 Table 4
This paper 0.49 Section 5.1
Rubens 2020 0.35 Section 4
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A.5 Policy appendix
A.5.1 Risk aversion calculation
Given a lognormal income process with mean µ and variance σ2, the relative risk premium
π for a farmer with Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) preferences and parameter γ
implies:
1− π = e−σ
2γ
2
In a one-period model, this equation answers the question: what fraction of her income would
a farmer give up to eliminate the risk of her income process? Recall from above that log
changes in international prices are approximately normally distributed with variance 0.11.
Given a pass-through rate of ρ, log changes in farmer income conditional on an equilibrium
are normally distributed with variance σ2 = 0.11ρ2. Letting Y denote total farmer income
in an equilibrium, the dollar amount a farmer would give up to eliminate her risk is:
Y × (1− π) = Y e− 0.11ρ
2γ
2
A farmer is indifferent between equilibria i and j if the amount of money she would give up











Solving this equation for γ yields:
γ = 2 log(Yi/Yj)0.11(ρ2i−ρ2j )
Plugging in the estimated pass-through rates and relative incomes across equilibria yield the
results in the text.
A.5.2 Back-of-the-envelope calculation
My back-of-the-envelope calculation combines estimates from this paper with external data
from 2019.
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Total agricultural exports were about 10B USD. The estimated farmer share is 0.24.
The estimated effect of Fair Trade on farmer income is 0.12. Multiplying these, we have an
increase in farmer income of 408M USD.
The labor force is approximately 9M people. The agricultural employment share is 0.3,
and the poverty rate in agriculture is 0.4. The annual income at the poverty line in Ecuador
is about 2000 USD. Multiplying these, we have that the amount need to raise all poor farmers
above the poverty line is 2.16B USD.
Dividing the increase in farmer income under Fair Trade by the amount needed to raise
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